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Abstract. Despite the large number of its references, this paper is less a survey than a sys-
tematic exposition, in an unifying framework, of the different equilibrium concepts elaborated
for studying provision of public goods. Assuming convexity as well on the consumption side as
on the production side, It studies their existence and their optimality properties, and also their
limits for founding public policy of market economies.
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1. Introduction
What is a public good? Should it be publicly or privately provided? How should be shared the burden of the
costs of its production? The aim of this paper is to gather and to present, from an analytical point of view and in
relation with a normative theory of public expenditure and public taxation, the answers given to these questions
in the framework of the general equilibrium model as defined in 1954 by Arrow–Debreu [1], promptly extended
to accommodate public goods, and since then constantly generalized.
We will leave outside this survey “positive” general equilibrium analysis [22, 27, 38, 51, 52, 53] that have as
a common feature to study mixed or “second best” economies where the presence and role of a public sector
are explicitely modelled and to consider public policy decisions on taxes, lump sum transfers and (possibly) the
provision of public goods as decisions to be kept separated from the analysis of the competitive functioning of the
economy.
Most of the normative theory is done in relation with Samuelson’s definition of public goods. A (pure)
public good, more precisely a collective consumption good, is formally defined by Samuelson [45, 46] as a good
whose each individual’s consumption leads to no subtraction from any other individual’s consumption. In this
definition, individual’s consumption is put as well for consumer’s consumption of the good as for its use as
an input by a producer. The problem dealt with by Samuelson is the research of conditions that guarantee
Date: April 14, 2010.
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optimality of the public goods provision. The conclusion (the two-folds message delivered by Samuelson’s papers)
is first that optimum exists, is multiple, depending on the particular form of the social utility function. But, the
externality in consumers’ preferences, inherent to the definition of public goods, prevents any implementation of
their optimal provision by a market mechanism: as often noticed, it is not in the interest of individuals to reveal
their preferences, a basic prerequisite for a functioning market solution. Likewise, a planning procedure would
require from an omniscient planner to know all consumers’ marginal rates of substitution between private and
public goods in order to set personalized prices which would allow for financing the chosen optimal public goods
provision.1
The different characteristics (non-excludability, non-rejectability) assigned by Samuelson to the restrictive
definition of (pure) public goods may be combined in more flexible ways [41, 43, 60, 61] with a more specific
sharing of the produced public goods, more subtle characteristics may be introduced in the analysis, a more
sophisticated modeling of externality may be proposed which takes into account phenomena of congestion and
cost of access to public goods or explicitly introduces transformation technologies of produced public goods into
shared consumption goods [47, 59]. Public goods may also be simply modelled as states of the world that affect
the utility level of consumers and shape the technological sets of producers. All these different variants in the
definition of externality may be accomodated to fit with the optimality and the equilibrium analysis which make
the content of equilibrium theories. The basic hypothesis is still that the domain of consumer’s sovereignty should
be extended to the choice of the amount of public goods to be provided; the basic methodology is that optimum
should be shown to be achieved through a decentralized process where public goods are produced by producers
and sold to consumers. It is under these basic hypothesis and methodology that the institutional questions raised
at the beginning of this introduction aim to finding an answer founded on a purely economic ground.
In order to see how equilibrium theory fulfills this research programme in response to the open questions raised
by Samuelson, we will first set the general framework of a competitive private ownership production economy with
public goods. Samuelson’s definition of (pure) public goods will be used as a first approximation, a benchmark
for further study of more complicated consumption phenomena. The objective is to specify, in this canonical
framework, existence, properties, significance and limits of two equilibrium concepts refered to by Samuelson: the
private provision equilibrium popularized thirty years after Samuelson’s articles by the famous paper of Bergstrom,
Blume and Varian [3], and the formalization by Foley [21] of what is called by Samuelson the equilibrium solution
of Lindahl [34, 35].
We will see that, under very mild assumptions, equilibrium exists in the private provision model, is optimal
in a sense of “constrained optimality” that we will define, and belongs to the “constrained core”. It even belongs
(see [14]) to the set of “constrained Edgeworth equilibria” and constrained Edgeworth equilibria can be decentral-
ized with prices as equilibria of the original private provision model. While (see [16]) constrained Pareto optimal
allocations can be decentralized as equilibria of an economy identical to the original one except for a convenient
redistribution of consumers’ initial endowments and profit shares. In other words, the whole machinery of gen-
eral equilibrium theory can be applied to this model which is intended to illustrate the case when provision of
public goods is done by way of charities, fondations and other corporate social responsibility institutions. Since
the welfare of each consumer depends not on his own provision but on the total provision of public goods, the
private provision model appears as a particular case of more general equilibrium models where individuals value
the consumption of the others, whether it is by altruism, envy or simply because they look at their relative
1The same conclusion will hold with the study of more dynamic planning procedures as [10, 36, 37] which
require too much information on individual characteristics for the social planner.
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wealth. As long as provision of public goods is the unique individual external concern of agents, private provision
equilibrium is sub-optimal for the only optimality notion which makes sense in public goods provision theory.
This sub-optimality is considered as the main drawback of the private provision model and calls for solutions to
this market failure.
Under the same mild assumptions, Lindahl–Foley equilibrium exists. Optimality of equilibrium is a direct
consequence of the definitions. However, decentralizing optimal allocations does not have the same interpretation
in terms of redistribution of the initial wealth as in the case where all goods are private. A possible solution is in
the introduction of a third equilibrium concept, defined by Foley in [20, 21], reminiscent of the Wicksellian [62]
principle of unanimity and voluntary consent in the matching of public expenditure and taxation. As in [30], it
will be denominated in this paper, Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium.
Lindahl–Foley equilibrium allocations are easily seen to be Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium
allocations and, as such, (weakly) Pareto optimal allocations. However their belonging to the core (a property
which gives, according to Foley [21], more rationale to considering Lindahl–Foley equilibrium allocations) requires
two additional assumptions, made by Foley and many others public goods provision theorists. Namely that
consumers’ preferences be monotonely increasing with the consumed amount of each public good and that using
public goods be unnecessary in the public goods production. Then, exactly as in private goods economies, optimal
allocations can be decentralized with Lindahl–Foley prices as Lindahl–Foley equilibria, after redistribution of initial
endowments and profit shares of consumers. Moreover, under these two assumptions, it was directly proved in [18]
that the core of a public good economy is nonempty, as well as the set of Edgeworth equilibria corresponding
to a convenient definition of replication of a public goods economy. Lindahl–Foley equilibria are obtained by
decentralizing with Lindahl-Foley prices Edgeworth equilibria. So that the whole machinery of equilibrium theory
can be applied to the Lindahl–Foley model, establishing a complete symmetry between Lindahl–Foley equilibrium
for public goods economies and Walras equilibrium for private goods economies.
However, the two previous assumptions prevent any application of the model to analysis of negative externalities
(public bads) and do not fit with the empirical evidence that most public goods, besides being the extreme case
of externalities in consumption, enter also as production factors which influence the firm’s ability to produce
(think of education, health, research, transportation means, etc...). This paper will show that these unpleasant
assumptions are necessary neither for the definition nor for the existence as well of private provision equilibrium
as of Lindahl–Foley equilibrium.
Before closing this introduction, it is necessary to stress that the results reported until now strongly depend,
as we will see, on convexity assumptions on preferences and production. However, externalities may generate
fundamental non-convexities (see [54, 55]). More simply, many so-called collective or public goods are also
classical examples of decreasing costs. Non-convexity on the production side requires government intervention for
enforcing pricing rules and the design of revenue distribution rules allowing consumers to survive and to finance a
possible deficit in the production of public goods. This adds new difficulties in the definition of market mechanisms
for public goods provision, To deal with this case and complement this exposition, a companion paper [17] will
rely on [26] for conditions of existence of a private provision equilibrium in non-convex production economies,
on [5] for existence of Lindahl equilibria, on [33] for the extension of the second welfare theorem in economies with
non-convexities and public goods, on [44] for the extension to the non-convex case of the Wicksell–Foley public
competitive equilibrium concept. The companion paper will also make clear the relations of all results (convex
case and nononvex case) with the abundant cost share equilibrium literature [7, 8, 9, 30, 31, 40, 58] that followed
in this domain a seminal Mas-Colell paper [39].
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The present paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set the general model of a competitive private
ownership production economy with public goods with its different equilibrium and optimality concepts. In
Sections 3 and 4, we give sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence respectively in the private provision and
the Lindahl–Foley models. In Sections 5 and 6, coming back to the Samuelson set of questions, we look for
decentralisation of optimal allocations and to their relation with the core of the economy. As a conclusion, in
Section 7, we show how equilibrium analysis of provision of public goods calls for re-introducing government as an
economic agent generally absent from equilibrium models, providing foundations for a theory of economic policy
of market economies.
2. The economy and its equilibrium and optimality concepts
We will define equilibrium and optimum concepts in the framework of a canonical private ownership production
economy with finitely many agents, a finite set L of private goods and a finite set K of public goods
E =
“
〈RL × RK ,RL × RK〉, (Xi, Pi, ei)i∈I , (Yj)j∈J , (θij) i∈I
j∈J
”
in which the existence of public goods entering as arguments in the consumers’ preferences is the only considered
externality.
• RL×RK is the commodity space and price space of the model. As usual, we will denote by (p, pg)·(z, zg) =
p · z + pg · zg the evaluation of (z, zg) ∈ RL × RK at prices (p, pg) ∈ RL × RK .
• There is a finite set I of consumers who jointly consume private goods and a common amount of public
goods that they eventually provide. Each consumer i has a consumption set Xi ⊂ RL×RK , a preference
correspondence Pi :
Q
h∈I Xh → Xi to be precisely defined below and an initial endowment ei ∈ RL×RK .
The interpretation ofXi and, consequently, the definition of Pi are different in the private provision model
and in the Lindahl–Foley model.
– In the private provision model (see [56]), for a generic element (xi, x
g
i ) ∈ Xi, xi is the private
commodity consumption of consumer i, while xgi denotes his private provision of public goods.
If piG denotes the projection onto RK of RL×RK , consumer i’s preferences are typically represented
by a correspondence Pi : Xi×Qh6=i piG(Xh)→ Xi which indicates for each x = `(xi, xgi ), (xgh)h6=i´ ∈
Xi ×Qh6=i piG(Xh) the set Pi(x) of the elements of Xi that consumer i prefers to (xi, xgi ) taking
as given the quantities of public goods provided by the other consumers whose sum,
added to his own provision, determines the amount of public goods he actually enjoys.2
– In the Lindahl–Foley model, for a generic element (xi, Gi) ∈ Xi of consumer i’s choice set, xi is still
the private commodity consumption of consumer i, while the components of the vector Gi denote
the amount of each public good that household i claims. Since the existence of public goods is the
only considered externality of our economy, Pi : Xi → Xi is simply a correspondence expressing a
binary relation on Xi.
• There is a finite set J of producers which jointly produce private and public goods. Each firm is
characterized by a production set Yj ⊂ RL × RK . We denote by (yj , ygj ) a generic point of Yj . Y =P
j∈J Yj denotes the total production set.
2For exemple, if ui : RL × RK → R denotes the utility function of consumer i (depending on his consump-
tion of private goods and the total provision of public goods), for
`
(xi, x
g
i ), (x
g
h)h6=i
´ ∈ Xi × Qh6=i piG(Xh),
Pi
`
(xi, x
g
i ), (x
g
h)h6=i
´
= {(x′i, x′gi ) ∈ Xi : ui(x′i, x′gi +
P
h6=i x
g
h) > ui(xi, x
g
i +
P
h6=i x
g
h)}.
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• For every firm j and each consumer i, the firm shares 0 ≤ θij ≤ 1 classically represent a contractual
claim of consumer i on the profit of firm j when it faces a price (p, pg) ∈ RL × RK . In a core and
Edgeworth equilibrium approach, the relative shares θij reflect consumer’s stock holdings which represent
proprietorships of production possibilities and θijYj is interpreted as a technology set at i’s disposal in
Yi. As usual,
P
i∈I θij = 1, for each j.
In a model where consumers are supposed to privately provide an amount of public goods that they all jointly
consume, feasibility of a consumption-private provision allocation (xi, x
g
i )i∈I is expressed by the relationX
i∈I
(xi, x
g
i ) ∈
(X
i∈I
ei
)
+
X
j∈J
Yj .
Definition 2.1. A private provision equilibrium of E is a t-uple`
(xi, x
g
i )i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, p
g) ∈
Y
i∈I
Xi ×
Y
j∈J
Yj × (RL × RK) \ {0}
such that
(1) for every j ∈ J , for every (yj , ygj ) ∈ Yj, (p, pg) · (yj , ygj ) ≤ (p, pg) · (yj , ygj ),
(2) for every i ∈ I, given the provisions (xgh)h6=i of the other consimers, (xi, xgi ) is optimal for the correspon-
dence Pi : Xi ×Qh6=i piG(Xh)→ Xi in the budget set
Bi(p, pg) =
˘
(xi, x
g
i ) ∈ Xi : p · xi + pg · xgi ≤ (p, pg) · ei +
X
j∈J
θij(p, p
g) · (yj , ygj )
¯
,
(3)
P
i∈I(xi, x
g
i ) =
P
i∈I ei +
P
j∈J(yj , y
g
j ).
Condition (1) states that each firm maximizes its profit taking as given the vector price (p, pg). Condition (2)
states that, taking as given prices and the public good provisions of the other consumers, (xi, x
g
i ) is an optimal
choice for consumer i in a budget set where he pays at the common market equilibrium price his consumption of
private goods and his provision of public goods. Condition (3) states the feasibility of the equilibrium allocation
as defined above.
In the Lindahl–Foley model, at a feasible private and public goods consumption allocation all consumers con-
sume a same amount of public goods. For the sake of coherence, we assume that consumers have no endowment
in public goods and set ei = (ωi, 0) where ωi ∈ RL is the private good endowment of consumer i. Feasibility
of a pair
`
(xi)i∈I , G
´
where for every i ∈ I, (xi, G) ∈ Xi is expressed by the relation
(
X
i∈I
xi, G) ∈
(X
i∈I
(ωi, 0)
)
+
X
j∈J
Yj .
Definition 2.2. A Lindahl–Foley equilibrium of E is a t-uple`
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, p
g
i )
´ ∈Y
i∈I
Xi ×
Y
j∈J
Yj ×
`
(RL × R|I|K) \ {0}´
such that:
(1) for every j ∈ J , for every (yj , ygj ) ∈ Yj, (p,
P
i∈I p
g
i ) · (yj , ygj ) ≤ (p,
P
i∈I p
g
i )) · (yj , ygj ),
(2) for every i ∈ I, (xi, G) is optimal for the correspondence P i : Xi → Xi in the budget set
Bi(p, p
g
i )) =
˘
(xi, G) ∈ Xi : p · xi + pgi ·G ≤ p · ωi +
X
j∈J
θij(p,
X
i∈I
pgi ) · (yj , ygj )
¯
,
(3) (
P
i∈I xi, G) =
P
i∈I(ωi, 0) +
P
j∈J(yj , y
g
j ).
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If, in the previous definition, we set pg =
P
i∈I p
g
i , each p
g
i can be thought of as a vector of personalized
consumption public good prices for the consumer i (See for example Foley [21], Milleron [42, Section 3]),
while pg is the vector of production public good prices. Then, as in the definition of private provision equilibrium,
Condition (1) means that each firm maximizes its profit taking as given the common vector price (p, pg). Condition
(2) means that each consumer chooses a consumption of private goods and claims an amount of public goods
provision, so as to optimize his preferences in his budget set taking as given the common price of private goods
and his personalized price vector for public goods. With Condition (3), equilibrium is characterized by feasibility
of the allocation, as defined in the Lindahl–Foley model, thus, in particular, by an unanimous consent on the
amount of public goods to be produced.
In the next equilibrium definition, feasibility of the equilibrium allocation is defined as in Lindahl–Foley
equilibrium, but the vector of personalized public good prices is replaced by a vector of personalized taxes whose
sum is equal to the equilibrium cost of the private goods used for producing the equilibrium provision of public
goods. In order to understand the equilibrium conditions, let us call government proposal relative to the
price system (p, pg) a couple
`
G, (ti)i∈I
´
of an amount of pubic goods provision with taxes to pay for it.
Besides classical market clearing, an additional equilibrium mechanism guarantees, given the equilibrium prices,
an unanimous negative consensus on the equilibrium government proposal.
Definition 2.3. A Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium of E is a t-uple`
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, p
g), (ti)i∈I
´ ∈Y
i∈I
Xi ×
Y
j∈J
Yj ×
`
(RL × RK) \ {0}´× RI
such that:
(1) for every j ∈ J , for every (yj , ygj ) ∈ Yj, (p, pg) · (yj , ygj ) ≤ (p, pg)) · (yj , ygj ) := pij(p, pg),
(2) for every i ∈ I, (xi, G) is optimal for the correspondence P i : Xi → Xi in the budget set
Bi(p, p
g, ti)) =
˘
(xi, G) ∈ Xi : p · xi + ti ≤ p · ωi
¯
,
(3) There is no
`
(xi, G)i∈I , (ti)i∈I
´ ∈Qi∈I Xi ×RI such that Pi∈I ti = pg ·G−Pj pij(p, pg) with for every
i ∈ I, (xi, G) ∈ Pi(xi, G) and p · xi + ti ≤ p · ωi.
(4) (
P
i∈I xi, G) =
P
i∈I(ωi, 0) +
P
j∈J(yj , y
g
j ) and
P
i∈I ti = p
g ·G−Pj∈J pij(p, pg).
In the previous definition, Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium involves profit maximization by pro-
ducers (Condition (1)), optimization by consumers of their private goods consumption, given the equilibrium
provision of public goods, under the after-tax budget constraint (Condition (2)), and the impossibility of finding
a new government proposal such that the sum of taxes together with the sum of equilibrium profits finances the
provision of public good and that appears to every consumer to leave him better off (Condition (3)). Condition
(4) adds to feasibility of the equilibrium allocation the requirement that together with the sum of equilibrium
profits, the sum of equilibrium taxes finances the equilibrium value of public goods. In view of Condition (1), it
is readily seen that
P
i∈I ti = −p ·
P
j∈J yj = p ·
P
i∈I(ωi − xi).
Notice that in each equilibrium definition, and in view of feasibility of equilibrium allocation and profit max-
imization, it is easily seen that the budget constraint of each consumer is bound at equilibrium. The next
proposition states specifically the relation between Lindahl–Foley and Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilib-
rium.
Proposition 2.1. Setting pg =
P
i∈I p
g
i and ti = p
g
i ·G−
P
j∈J θij(p · yj + pg · ygj ), a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium`
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, p
g
i )
´
is a Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium.
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Proof. Condition (1) in Definition 2.3 follows from Condition (1) in Definition 2.2. For each i ∈ I, Bi(p, pg, ti)) ⊂
Bi(p, p
g
I)) and (xi, G) ∈ Bi(p, pgI))∩Bi(p, pg, ti)), so that Condition (2) in Definition 2.3 follows from Condition (2)
in Definition 2.2. To verify Condition (3) in Definition 2.3, assume by contraposition that
`
(xi, G)i∈I , (ti)i∈I
´ ∈Q
i∈I Xi×RI verifies
P
i∈I ti = p
g ·G−Pj pij(p, pg) with for every i ∈ I, (xi, G) ∈ Pi(xi, G) and p ·xi+ ti ≤ p ·ωi.
From Condition (2) in Definition 2.2, we deduce for each i ∈ I, p ·xi+pgi ·G > p ·ωi+
P
j∈J θij(p,
P
i∈I p
g
i ) ·(yj , ygj )
and summing over i, p ·Pi∈I xi+pg ·G > p ·Pi∈I ωi+Pj∈J(p, pg) · (yj , ygj ). But, in view of the condition on the
sum of taxes, one has also: p ·Pi∈I xi+ pg ·G ≤ p ·Pi∈I ωi+Pj∈J(p, pg) · (yj , ygj ), which yields a contradiction.
As usually, the quasiequilibrium definitions keep in each model the profit maximization and feasibility condi-
tions of equilibrium and replace preference optimization in the budget set by the requirement that each consumer
is binding his/her budget constraint and could not be strictly better off spending strictly less.
Definition 2.4. A private provision quasiequilibrium of E is a t-uple`
(xi, x
g
i )i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, p
g) ∈
Y
i∈I
Xi ×
Y
j∈J
Yj × (RL × RK) \ {0}
verifying conditions (1) and (3) of Definition 2.1 and
(2’) for every i ∈ I, p ·xi+pg ·xgi = (p, pg) ·ei+
P
j∈J θij(p, p
g) ·(yj , ygj ) and (xi, xgi ) ∈ Pi
`
(xi, x
g
i ), (x
g
h)h6=i
´⇒
p · xi + pg · xgi ≥ p · xi + pg · xgi .
If for some i ∈ I, (xi, xgi ) ∈ Pi
`
(xi, x
g
i ), (x
g
h)h6=i
´
actually implies p · xi + pg · xgi > p · xi + pg · xgi , the private
provision quasi-equilibrium is said to be non-trivial.
Definition 2.5. A Lindahl–Foley quasiequilibrium of E is a t-uple`
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, (p
g
i )i∈I)
´ ∈Y
i∈I
Xi ×
Y
j∈J
Yj ×
`
(RL × R|I|K \ {0}´
verifying Conditions (1) and (3) of Definition 2.2 and
(2’) for every i ∈ I, p ·xi+pgi ·G = p ·ωi+
P
j∈J θij(p, p
g) · (yj , ygj ) and (xi, G) ∈ Pi(xi, G)⇒ p ·xi+pgi ·G ≥
p · xi + pgi ·G.
If for some i ∈ I, (xi, G) ∈ Pi
`
(xi, G)
´
actually implies p · xi + pgi · G > p · xi + pgi · G, the Lindahl–Foley
quasi-equilibrium is said to be non-trivial.
Like the equilibrium concepts, optimality and core concepts are very different in the private provision and in
the Lindahl–Foley model or in the public competitive equilibrium model (Recall that Lindahl–Foley and public
competitive equilibrium share the same condition for feasibility of an allocation).
Definition 2.6. A Lindahl–Foley feasible consumption allocation
`
(xi)i∈I , G
´
is (weakly) Pareto optimal if
there exists no Lindahl–Foley feasible consumption allocation
`
(xi)i∈I , G
´
such that
(xi, G) ∈ Pi(xi, G) for each i ∈ I.
Let S ⊂ I, S 6= 6© be a coalition.
Definition 2.7. Lindahl–Foley feasibility for S of the pair
`
(xi)i∈S , GS
´
, where for each i ∈ S, (xi, GS) ∈ Xi,
is defined by
(
X
i∈S
xi, G
S) ∈
(X
i∈S
(ωI , 0)
)
+
X
i∈S
X
j∈J
θijYj .
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The Lindahl–Foley S-feasible pair
`
(xi)i∈S , GS
´
improves upon or blocks the Lindahl–Foley feasible allocation`
(xi)i∈I , G
´
if
(xi, G
S) ∈ Pi(xi, G) for each i ∈ S.
The core C(E) is the set of all Lindahl–Foley feasible consumption allocations that no coalition can improve upon.
In the private provision model, preferences of each agent are constrained by the public good private provisions
of the other agents. For this reason, we will speak of constrained optimality (some kind of second best concept)
and of constrained core.
Definition 2.8. A feasible consumption allocation (xi, x
g
i )i∈I of the private provision model is (weakly) con-
strained Pareto optimal if there is no feasible consumption allocation (xi, x
g
i )i∈I such that
(xi, x
g
i ) ∈ Pi
`
(xi, x
g
i ), (x
g
h)h6=i
´
for each i ∈ I.
If we set GS =
P
i∈S x
g
i , feasibility for the coalition S of (xi, x
g
i )i∈S ∈
Q
i∈S Xi in the private provision model
corresponds to S-feasibility of
`
(xi)i∈S , GS
´
in the Lindahl–Foley model.
Definition 2.9. In the private provision model, the coalition S improves upon the feasible consumption allocation
(xi, x
g
i )i∈I via the S-feasible allocation (xi, x
g
i )i∈S ∈
Q
i∈S Xi if
(xi, x
g
i ) ∈ Pi
`
(xi, x
g
i ), (x
g
h)h6=i
´
for each i ∈ S.
The constrained core Cc(E) is the set of all feasible consumption allocations of the private provision model that
no coalition can improve upon.
It simply follows from the definitions that a private provision equilibrium consumption allocation is (weakly)
constrained Pareto optimal and belongs to the constrained core Cc(E)) of the economy. It even belongs to the
set of “constrained Edgeworth equilibria” (See [14] for a definition and a study of conditions which allow for a
decentralization with prices of a constrained Edgeworth equilibrium allocation as a private provision equilibrium
consumption allocation). But a private provision equilibrium consumption allocation has no reason
to lead to a Pareto optimal provision of public goods. In suitably defined private provision models,
one can verify that, unlike Lindahl–Foley equilibrium consumption allocations, consumption–private provision
equilibrium allocations do not satisfy Samuelson’s first order conditions for optimality and examples abound in
the litterature [3, 56] of redistributions of initial endowments that increase the equilibrium public provision of
public goods, thus are Pareto improving in case of monotone increasing preferences relative to public goods. With
the free-riding problem, sub-optimality of equilibrium is the main drawback of the private provision equilibrium
concept.
In counterpart, it also simply follows from the definitions that a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium consumption
allocation is (weakly) Pareto optimal but does not necessarily belong to the core C(E). We will give in Section
4 sufficient conditions for Lindahl–Foley equilibrium allocations to belong to the core. In the two next sections,
we study the consistency of the just defined equilibrium concepts by looking for conditions of existence of private
provision equilibria as well as of Lindahl–Foley equilibria.
3. Quasiequilibrium and equilibrium existence in the private provision model
In the framework of the private provision model, in order to get an equilibrium result, we will use the strategy
of proof of Shafer–Sonnenschein [51] associating to the private provision economy an abstract economy and its
conditions for equilibrium existence. However, we depart from [51] in three respects. We look for an equilibrium
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without disposal (as in Shafer [49]). We also first prove the existence of a quasiequilibrium, before looking for
additional conditions under which the quasi-equilibrium is an equilibrium. For this, we use a definition and
existence result of quasiequilibrium in abstract economies borrowed from a paper of mine [12], unpublished in
1980, published in french in 1981 in citeFlo81, and used (with all details of its proof) in subsequent published
papers (see, for example, [15]). Finally, using ideas of Gale–Mas-Colell [23, 24], we slightly weaken the continuity
assumptions on preference correspondences used by Shafer–Sonnenschein.
Let us first give the definition of an abstract economy and its quasi-equilibrium.
Definition 3.1. An abstract economy (or generalized qualitative game) is completely specified by
Γ = ((Xi, αi, Pi)i∈N )
where N is a finite set of agents (players) and, for each i ∈ N ,
• Xi is a choice set (or strategy set),
• the correspondence
αi :
Y
k∈N
Xk → Xi
is called constraint correspondence (or feasible strategy correspondence),
• the correspondence
Pi :
Y
k∈N
Xk → Xi
is a preference correspondence.
Let X =
Q
k∈N Xk. For each x ∈ X, αi(x) is interpreted as the set of possible strategies for player i, given the
choice (xk)k 6=i of the other players. For each x ∈ X, under the condition that xi /∈ Pi(x), Pi(x) is interpreted as
the set of elements of Xi strictly preferred by player i to xi when the choice of the other players is (xk)k 6=i.
Now, for each i ∈ N , let βi : Qk∈N Xk → Xi be a correspondence satisfying for all x ∈Qk∈N Xk
(3.1) βi(x) ∈ αi(x),
(3.2) if βi(x) 6= 6© , then cl(βi(x)) = cl(αi(x)).
Definition 3.2. Given β = (βi)i∈N as above, x = (xi)i∈N ∈ X is a β-quasiequilibrium of Γ if for each for each
i ∈ N ,
(1) xi ∈ αi(x)
(2) Pi(x) ∩ βi(x) = 6©.
It is an equilibrium if or each for each i ∈ N ,
(1) xi ∈ αi(x)
(2) Pi(x) ∩ αi(x) = 6©.
Lemma 3.3. Let Γ =
`
(Xi, αi, Pi)i∈N , X
´
be an abstract economy with a finite set N of agents where X is a
nonempty closed convex subset of
Q
i∈N Xi, and αi : X → Xi and Pi : X → Xi are correspondences respectively
interpreted as constraint and preference correspondences for agent i. Let for each i ∈ N , βi : X → Xi satisfying
the above relations 3.1 and 3.2. Assume that for every i ∈ N ,
(a) Xi is a nonempty compact convex subset of some inite dimensional Euclidean vector space,
(b) αi is an upper semicontinuous and nonempty closed convex valued correspondence,
(c) βi is convex valued,
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(d) Pi is a convex valued correspondence such that for all x ∈ Qk∈N Xk xi /∈ Pi(x) and the correspondence
x→ βi(x) ∩ Pi(x) is lower semicontinuous.
Then Γ has a β-quasiequilibrium x. It is an equilibrium (that is, for each i ∈ N , Pi(x)∩αi(x) = 6©) provided that
for every i, βi(x) 6= 6© and Pi(x) is open in Xi.
Coming back to the economy E , let
A(E) =
(`
(xi, x
g
i )i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J
´ ∈Y
i∈I
Xi ×
Y
j∈J
Yj :
X
i∈I
(xi, x
g
i ) =
X
i∈I
ei +
X
j∈J
(yj , y
g
j )
)
be the set of feasible allocations. Let bXi, bX and bYj denote the projections of A(E) respectively on Xi, Qi∈I Xi
and Yj . We make on E the following assumptions.
A.1: For each i ∈ I,
(a) Xi is convex and closed, and bXi is compact,
(b) Pi : Xi ×Qh6=i piG(Xh)→ Xi is lower semicontinuous,
(c) For each (xh, x
g
h)h∈I ∈ bX, Pi`(xi, xgi ), (xgh)h6=i´) is convex,
and (xi, x
g
i ) ∈ clPi
`
(xi, x
g
i ), (x
g
h)h6=i
´ \ Pi`(xi, xgi ), (xgh)h6=i´),
(d) ei ∈ Xi −Pj∈J θijYj ;
A.2: For each j ∈ J , Yj is convex and closed, and bYj is compact.
The following proposition is proved using Lemma 3.3 and standard techniques explained in [49, 16].
Proposition 3.1. Under Assumptions A.1 and A.2, the private provision economic model E has a quasiequi-
librium
`
(xi, x
g
i )i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, p
g) ∈ Qi∈I Xi ×Qj∈J Yj × (RL × RK) \ {0}. Under the additional continuity
assumption that each correspondence Pi has open (in Xi) values at every (xh, x
g
h) ∈ bX, the quasiequilibrium is
nontrivial if
P
i∈I ei ∈ int
`P
i∈I Xi −
P
j∈J Yj
´
.
Note that the quasiequilibrium price (p, pg) is nonnull but, obviously, not necessarily positive. Replacing in
Assumption A.1 (b) by
(b’) Each correspondence Pi : Xi ×Qh6=i piG(Xh) → Xi has open lower sections in Xi ×Qh6=i piG(Xh) and
open (in Xi) values at every (xh, x
g
h) ∈ bX.
the same quasiequilibrium existence result can be proved using as in [14] the definition of Edgeworth equilibria
for this kind of constrained preferences, their existence and their decentralization by nonnull quasiequilibrium
prices. If the correspondences Pi are convex valued, Assumption (b’) is slightly weaker than the assumption
in Shafer–Sonnenschein [50] that the Pi have an open graph, equivalent if correspondences Pi are assumed to
have open values for every (xh, x
g
h) ∈ X (See a proof of this equivalence in Shafer [48] or in [4]). Our emphasis
on the conditions of existence of a non trivial quasiequilibrium is justified by the well-known fact that several
irreducibility conditions on the economy guarantee that a non-trivial quasiequilibrium is an equilibrium.
Before closing this section, two remarks are in order.
Remark 3.4. The definition of an abstract economy and the statement of Lemma 3.3 allow for considering other
types of externality in consumers’ preferences than the simple existence of public goods. Consumers’ preferences
may depend more generally on the current consumption and production allocation and on current prices as it was
demanded by Arrow–Hahn [2]. In particular, Lemma 3.3 implies equilibrium existence in exchange economies
with only private goods where individuals value not only their own consumption but, as in [25], the current
consumption allocation.
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Remark 3.5. An economy with only private goods and no externality in preferences is a particular case of the
private provision model studied in this section. Proposition 3.1 obviously applies to production economies without
any public good or externality. This remark will be used in the next section.
4. Quasiequilibrium and equilibrium existence in the Lindahl–Foley model
Economy E is now the economy associated with a Lindahl–Foley model as explained in the beginning of
section 2. We assume in particular that consumers have no endowment in public goods, thus that for each i ∈ I,
ei = (ωi, 0) and that the values of Pi : Xi → Xi does not depend on the consumptions of the other consumers.
One could get quasiequilibrium existence in the Lindahl–Foley model using, as for the private provision model, a
simultaneous optimization proof based on a slight modification of the definition and the quasiequilibrium existence
result for an abstract economy. This is not the strategy generally adopted sincer Foley [20, 21] and that we follow
now.
We extend3 the commodity space by considering each consumer’s bundle of public goods as a separate group
of commodities. On this (L+ |I|K)- dimensional commodity space, we associate with E the production economy
E ′ =
“
〈RL × R|I|K ,RL × R|I|K〉(X ′i, P ′i , e′i)i∈I , (Y ′j )j∈J , (θij) i∈I
j∈J
”
defined in the following way:
• For each i ∈ I,
– X ′i = {x′i = (xi, 0, . . . , Gi, . . . , 0) ∈ RL × (RK)|I| : (xi, Gi) ∈ Xi}
– e′i = (ωi, 0, . . . , 0, . . . , 0)
– For each x′i = (xi, 0, . . . , Gi, . . . , 0) ∈ X ′i,
P ′i (x
′
i) = {ex′i = (exi, 0, . . . , eGi, . . . , 0) ∈ X ′i : (exi, eGi) ∈ Pi`(xi, Gi)´}
• For each j ∈ J , Y ′j = {y′j = (yj , ygj , . . . , ygj , . . . , ygj ) ∈ RL × (RK)|I| : (yj , ygj ) ∈ Yj}.
Let
A(E) =
(`
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J
´ ∈Y
i∈I
Xi ×
Y
j∈J
Yj :
X
i∈I
xi =
X
i∈I
ωi +
X
j∈J
yj ; G =
X
j∈J
ygj
)
denote the set of feasible Lindahl–Foley allocations of E and
A(E ′) =
(`
(x′i)i∈I , (y
′
j)j∈j
´ ∈Y
i∈I
X ′i ×
Y
j∈J
Y ′j :
X
i∈I
x′i =
X
i∈I
e′i +
X
j∈J
y′j
)
denote the set of feasible allocations of E ′. Under the definitions given above, `(x′i)i∈I , (y′j)j∈j´ ∈ A(E ′) if and
only if
`
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J
´
. Let bXi (resp. bX ′i) and bYj (resp. bY ′j ) denote the projections of A(E) (resp. A(E ′))
on Xi (resp.X
′
i) and Yj (resp. Y
′
j ).
Economy E ′ is an economy with no public good and no externality. In order to apply to this economy the
quasiequilibrium existence result obtained in the previous section, we set on E the following assumptions.
B.1: For each i ∈ I,
(a) Xi = RL+ × RK+ and bXi is compact,
(b) Pi : Xi → Xi is lower semicontinuous,
(c) For each (xi, G) ∈ bXi, Pi(xi, G) is convex,
and (xi, G) ∈ clPi(xi, G) \ Pi(xi, G),
(d) (ωi, 0) ∈ Xi;
3Independently of Foley, the same strategy was applied in an unpublished paper of F. Fabre-Sender [11], quoted
in [42].
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B.2: For each j ∈ J , Yj is convex and closed, contains (0, 0), and bYj is compact.
It is readily seen that if E satisfies these assumptions, then E ′ satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 3.1. Thus,
starting from a quasiequilibrium
`
(x′i)i∈I , (y
′
j)j∈J , pi
´
of E ′ with pi = (p, (pgi )i∈I) ∈ RL+|I|K \ {0}, and setting
pg =
P
i∈I p
g
i , one deduces from the definition ofX
′
i and Y
′
j that there exists
`
(xi, G), (yj , y
g
j )
´ ∈Qi∈I Xi×Qj∈J Yj
such that
`
(xi, G), (yj , y
g
j ), (p, (p
g
i )i∈I)
´
is a Lindahl-Foley quasiequilibrium of E . We have thus proved:
Proposition 4.1. Under the above Assumptions B.1 and B.2, the Lindahl–Foley model E has a quasiequilibrium`
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, (p
g
i )i∈I)
´ ∈Qi∈I Xi ×Qj∈J Yj × `(RL × R|I|K) \ {0}´.
The easy proof of the following corollary can be found in [18] and is sketched here for the sake of completeness
of the paper .
Corollary 4.1. Under the additional continuity assumption that each correspondence Pi has open (in Xi) values
at every (xi, G) ∈ bXi, the quasiequilibrium is nontrivial if
NT:
P
i∈I(ωi, 0) ∈ int
`
RL+ × RK+ −
P
j∈J Yj
´
.
Proof. Recalling that the quasiequilibrium price (p, (pgi )i∈I) is nonnull, let (u, v) ∈ RL × RK be such that
(p,
P
i∈I p
g
i ) · (u, v) < 0 and (
P
i∈I , 0) + (u, v) ∈ (RL+ × RK+ )−
P
j∈J Yj . one can write for some (xi)i∈I ∈ (RL+)I ,
G ∈ RK+ , (yj , ygj )j∈J ∈
Q
j∈J X
i∈I
(ωi, 0) + (u, v) =
`X
i∈I
xi, G)−
X
j∈J
(yj , y
g
j
´
.
One deduces: X
i∈I
(p · xi + pgi ·G) < p ·
X
i∈I
ωi +
X
j∈J
(p,
X
i ∈ Ipgi ) · (yj , ygj )
≤ p ·
X
i∈I
ωi +
X
j∈J
(p,
X
i ∈ Ipgi ) · (yj , ygj ) =
X
i∈I
(p · xi + pgi ·G).
It classically follows that at least one consumer i satisfies at (xi, G) his budget constraint with a strict inequality,
and thus is optimal at (xi, G) in his budget set as a consequence of the additional continuity assumption made
on consumers’ preferences.
In the following assumption, in order to get information on respectively the quasiequilibrium price of private
goods and the vector of personalized prices of public goods, the local no-satiation assumption contained in
Assumption B.1 (c) is replaced by the stronger assumption of local no-satiation in private goods at any component
of a Lindahl–Foley feasible consumption allocation. At every Lindahl–Foley feasible consumption allocation, one
assumes in addition global no-satiation in public goods for at least one consumer. This is summarized in the
following assumption.
B.3: If
`
(xh)h∈I , G) is a Lindahl–Foley feasible consumption allocation,
(a) For each i ∈ I, for every neighborhood U of (xi, G) in Xi, there exists x′i such that (x′i, G) ∈ U
and (x′i, G) ∈ Pi((xi, G)),
(b) There exists i ∈ I and Gi such that (xi, Gi) ∈ Xi and (xi, Gi) ∈ Pi((xi, G)).
Under this assumption, the next proposition completes the previous one. One should note that, besides the fact
that B.3(a) states precisely the local no-satiation assumption contained in B.1(c), Assumptions B.3 (a) and (b)
are tailored for getting the conclusions (1) and (2) of the next proposition.
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Proposition 4.2. Let
`
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, (p
g
i )i∈I)
´
be the quasiequilibrium obtained in Proposition 4.1.
If each correspondence Pi has open (in Xi) values at every (xi, G) ∈ bXi and if Assumption B.3 is added to the
different assumptions of Proposition 4.1, then
(1) The quasiequilibrium price vector for private goods, p, is nonnull, provided that the quasiequilibrium is
non-trivial.
(2) If the quasiequilibrium is an equilibrium, then (pgi )i∈I 6= 0.
(3) Under some irreducibility condition, a non-trivial quasiequilibrium is actually an equilibrium.
Remark 4.2. The non-triviality condition NT is satisfied under the following mild conditions that the total
initial endowment in private goods is strictly positive and that each public good is productible:
• ω  0,
• there is some (y, yg) ∈ Y :=Pj∈J Yj such that yg  0.
Remark 4.3. The role of an irreducibility assumption is to guarantee that, at the quasiequilibrium price, all
consumers can satisfy with a strict inequality their budget constraint as soon as this is possible for at least one
of them. Such a condition, inspired by Arrow–Hahn [2], was given in [18]:
IR: For any non-trivial partition {I1, I2} of the set I of consumers and for any Lindahl–Foley feasible
consumption allocation (xi, G)i∈I , there exists a consumption allocation (exi, eG)i∈I and eω such that
• (exi, eG) ∈ clPi(xi, G) ∀i ∈ I1 with for some i0 ∈ I1, (exi, eG) ∈ Pi(xi, G),
• (Pi∈I exi, eG) ∈ {(eω, 0)}+Pj∈J Yj with, for each coordinate ` ∈ L, eω` > ω` ⇒Pi∈I2 ω`i > 0.
The obvious interpretation of this condition is that for any partition {I1, I2} of the set I of consumers into
two nonempty subgroups and for each feasible allocation, the group I1 may be moved to a preferred position
feasible with a new vector of total resources in private goods by increasing the total resources of commodities
which can be supplied in positive amount by the group I2. To see how IR is an irreducibilty assumption, let`
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, (p
g
i )i∈I)
´
be the quasiequilibrium of E , I1 be the set of consumers who can verify their
budget constraint with a strict inequality, I2 be the set of consumers for whom this is impossible, a set that we
assume to be nonempty. If (exi, eG)i∈I and eω are as in Assumption IR, we can write eω − ω = αPi∈I2(ωi − x′i)
with α > 0 and xi ∈ Xi ∀i ∈ I2. Then
p ·
X
i∈I1
(exi − ωi) + (X
i∈I1
pgi ) · eG > X
i∈I1
θij
X
j∈J
(p · eyj + pg · eygj ),
(1 + α)
ˆ
p · `X
i∈I2
exi + αx′i
1 + α
− ωi
´
+ (
X
i∈I2
pgi ) ·
eG
1 + α
˜ ≥ (1 + α)X
i∈I2
θij
X
j∈J
(p · eyj + pg · eygj ),
that is
p · ˆX
i∈I2
exi −X
i∈I2
ωi + ω − eω˜+ (X
i∈I2
pgi ) · eG ≥ (1 + α)X
i∈I2
θij
X
j∈J
(p · eyj + pg · eygj ) ≥ X
i∈I2
θij
X
j∈J
(p · eyj + pg · eygj ),
the last inequality following from the positivity of the value of the maximum profit of each producer. Summing
in I ∈ I the first and the third of the previous relations, we get
p ·
X
i∈I
(exi − ωi) + (X
i∈I
pgi ) · eG >X
j∈J
(p · eyj + pg · eygj ),
which contradicts the feasibility for total resources eω of the consumption allocation (exi, eG)i∈I .
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Remark 4.4. In the literature, it is sometimes assumed that each consumer i ∈ I has a strictly positive initial
endowment ωi  0 and a continuous complete preference preorder i on his consumptin set Xi, weakly monotone
relative to public goods and strictly monotone relative to private goods. Then non-triviality and irreducibilty
conditions are of no use and, under the other conditions of Proposition 4.1 and Part (b) of Assumption B.3, an
equilibrium exists with p 0 and (pgi )i∈I > 0 (that is ≥ 0 and not equal to 0).
5. Decentralization with prices of (weakly) Pareto optimal Lindahl–Foley feasible consumption
allocations
As already noticed, (weak) Pareto optimality of a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium consumption allocation simply
follows from the definitions. The same is true for Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium consumption
allocations.
Proposition 5.1. Let
`
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, p
g), (ti)i∈I
´
be a Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium.
The consumption allocation (xi, G)i∈I is (weakly) Pareto optimal.
Proof. Assume by contraposition that there is
`
(xi)i∈I , G
´
such that (xi, G) ∈ Pi(xi, G) ∀i ∈ I and (Pi∈I xi, G) =
(
P
i∈I ωi, 0) +
P
j∈J(yj , y
g
j ). Thus
P
j∈J yj =
P
i∈I(xi − ωi) and
P
j∈J y
g
j = G. In view of Condition (1) in
Definition 2.3, for every j ∈ J , p ·yj+pg ·yg ≤ p ·yj+pg ·yg = pij(p, pg) and by summing on i, p ·
P
j∈J yj+p
g ·G ≤P
j∈J pij(p, p
g). Let us first set for each i, ti = p · ωi − p · xi. Summing on i, Pi∈I ti = −Pj∈J p · yj ≥
pg · G −Pj∈J pij(p, pg). If Pi∈I ti = pg · G −Pj∈J pij(p, pg), the government proposal (G, (ti)i∈I) contradicts
Condition (3) of Definition 2.3. If
P
i∈I ti > p
g · G −Pj∈J pij(p, pg), it suffices to define (t′i)i∈I such that
t′i ≤ ti ∀i ∈ Iand
P
i∈I t
′
i = p
g · G − Pj∈J pij(p, pg) to contradict Condition (3) of Definition 2.3,with the
government proposal (G, (t′i)i∈I).
Weak Pareto optimality of Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium allocations is not surprising. Con-
dition (3) of Definition 2.3 guarantees that, in some sense, the grand coalition cannot block the equilibrium
consumption allocation. In view of Proposition 2.1, (weak) Pareto optimality of Lindahl–Foley feasible consump-
tion allocations, obvious from the simple definitions, is also a consequence of the previous proposition and is
nothing else than a statement of the first welfare theorem for public goods economies. The purpose of this section
is to give converse results.
The next proposition simply extends to convex production sets Theorem of Section 3 in Foley [21].
Proposition 5.2. Assume B.1, B.2, B.3, NT and IR on E. Let `(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , ygj )j∈J´ be a Lindahl–Foley
feasible allocation of E such that (xi, G)i∈I is (weakly) Pareto optimal. Then there exists a price system (p, (pgi )i∈I)
such that, setting pg =
P
i∈I p
g
i ,
(1) for every j ∈ J , for every (yj , ygj ) ∈ Yj, (p, pg) · (yj , ygj ) ≤ (p, pg) · (yj , ygj ) := pij((p, pg),
(2) for every i ∈ I, (xi, Gi) ∈ Pi(xi, G) implies p · xi + pgi ·Gi > p · xi + pgi ·G.
Proof. Let
D =
(`
z, (Gi)i∈I
´− `X
i∈I
ωi, 0, . . . , 0, . . . , 0
´
: z =
X
i∈I
xi and (xi, Gi) ∈ Pi(xi, G) ∀i ∈ I
)
,
F =
(`
y, (yg, . . . , yg, . . . , yg)
´
: (y, yg) =
X
j∈J
(yj , y
g
j ) with (yj , y
g
j ) ∈ Yj ∀j ∈ J
)
.
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The sets D and F are nonempty, convex and it follows from the (weak) Pareto optimality of the allocation that
D∩F = 6©. From the first separation theorem, there exists `p, (pgi )i∈I´ 6= 0 and α ∈ R such that for all j ∈ J , for
all (yj , y
g
j ) ∈ Yj , for all i ∈ I, for all (xi, Gi) ∈ Pi(xi, G),
p ·
X
i∈I
(xi − ωi) +
X
i∈I
pgi ·Gi ≥ α ≥ p ·
X
j∈J
yj + (
X
i∈I
pgi ) ·
X
j∈J
ygj .
From local no-satiation at each (xi, G), and since
`
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J
´
is a Lindahl–Foley feasible allocation,
we get
p ·
X
i∈I
(xi − ωi) + (
X
i∈I
pgi ) ·G = α = p ·
X
j∈J
yj + (
X
i∈I
pgi ) ·
X
j∈J
ygj .
from which we deduce: for every j ∈ J , for every (yj , ygj ) ∈ Yj , (p,
P
i∈I p
g
i ) · (yj , ygj ) ≤ (p,
P
i∈I p
g
i )) · (yj , ygj ), and
for every i ∈ I, (xi, Gi) ∈ Pi(xi, G) implies p · xi + pgi ·Gi ≥ p · xi + pgi ·G.
In view of Assumptions NT and IR, one shows exactly as in Section 4 that for every i ∈ I, (xi, Gi) ∈ Pi(xi, G)
actually implies p · xi + pgi ·Gi > p · xi + pgi ·G.
A first corollary of Proposition 5.2 shows that, under the assumptions of the proposition, the set of (weakly)
Pareto optimal consumption allocations actually coincides with the set of public competitive equilibrium con-
sumption allocations.
Corollary 5.1. Assume, as in Proposition 5.2, B.1, B.2, B.3, NT and IR on E and that `(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , ygj )j∈J´
is a Lindahl–Foley feasible allocation of E such that (xi, G)i∈I is (weakly) Pareto optimal. If (p, (pgi )i∈I) is the
price vector obtained in Proposition 5.2 and If we set pg =
P
i∈I p
g
i and for each i ∈ I, ti = p · ωi − p · xi, then`
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, p
g), (ti)i∈I
´
is a public competitive equilibrium.
Proof. From (1) in Proposition 5.2, the profit maximization is verified. Moreover,
P
i∈I ti = p·
P
i∈I(ωi−xi) = −p·P
j∈J yj = p
g ·G−Pj∈J pij(p, pg). IfPi∈I ti = pg ·G−Pj∈J pij(p, pg) with for each i ∈ I, (xi, G) ∈ Pi(xi, G), one
deduces from (2) in Proposition 5.2: p·xi+pgi ·G > p·xi+pgi ·G ∀i ∈ I, thus p·
P
i∈I xi+
P
i∈I ti > p
P
i∈I ωi, which
proves Condition (3) of Definition2.3. On the other hand, for each i ∈ I, p ·xi+ ti = p ·ωi and (xi, G) ∈ Pi(xi, G)
implies p · xi > p · xi thus p · xi + ti > p · ωi, which proves Condition (2) of the same definition.
To go further on the decentralization with prices of Lindahl–Foley feasible (weakly) Pareto optimal allocations,
notice that in Proposition 5.2,
`
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, (p
g
i )i∈I)
´
corresponds for the Lindahl–Foley model to
what is called valuation equilibrium or equilibrium relative to a price system in an economy with only
private goods. In our public goods economy, with respect to the (weak) Pareto optimal consumption allocation
(xi, G)i∈I , prices (p, (p
g
i )i∈I , p
g =
P
i∈I p
g
i ) have the same normative interpretation as in the usual Second Welfare
Theorem. Announced and enforced by a coordinating center, such prices have the property that no consumer
will depart from the Pareto optimal consumption allocation (xi, G)i∈I and that no producer will depart from the
corresponding production allocation (yj , y
g
j )j∈J . The achieved equilibrium corresponds to a vector of individual
taxes for public goods equal to (pgi )i∈I and to a vector of individual lump sum transfers (T i)i∈I , each one equal
to
T i = p · xi + pgi ·G−
`
p · ωi +
X
j∈J
θijpij(p, p
g)
´
,
the sum over i ∈ I of T i being obviously equal to zero.
The interpretation of (p, (pgi )i∈I) in terms of Lindahl–Foley equilibrium prices for a convenient redistribution
of initial endowments and profit shares is more difficult.
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A simple corollary of Minkowski–Farkas Lemma (see Corollary 2.3.2. in [19]) gives necessary and sufficient
conditions for finding profit shares (θ′ij) i∈I
j∈J
≥ 0 such that Pj∈J θ′ij = 1 ∀i ∈ I and for every i ∈ I,
p · xi + pgi ·G = p · ωi +
X
j∈J
θ′ij(p · yj + pg · ygj ) = p · ωi +
X
j∈J
θ′ijpij(p, p
g).
Corollary 5.2. Let
`
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J
´
be an equilibrium allocation relative to the price system
`
p, (pgi )i∈I)
´
.
There exists some (endogenous) system of profit shares (θ′ij) i∈I
j∈J
such that
`
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, (p
g
i )i∈I)
´
is
a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium of the public goods economy E ′ = `(RL+ × RG+, Pi, (ωi, 0))i∈I , (Yj)j∈J , (θ′ij) i∈I
j∈J
´
if and
only if for every i ∈ I, for every α ∈ R,
pij(p, p
g) ≤ α ∀j ∈ J =⇒ p · (xi − ωi) + pgi ·G ≤ α,
pij(p, p
g) ≥ α ∀j ∈ J =⇒ p · (xi − ωi) + pgi ·G ≥ α.
A necessary condition is in particular that for every i ∈ I, p · (xi − ωi) + pgi ·G ≥ 0.
Corollary 5.3. If there is only one producer and if for every i ∈ I, p · (xi − ωi) + pgi · G ≥ 0, then there
exists an endogenous system of profit shares, (θ′i)i∈I , such that
`
(xi, G)i∈I , (y,G), (p, (p
g
i )i∈I)
´
is a Lindahl–Foley
equilibrium of the public goods economy E ′ = `(RL+ × RG+, Pi, (ωi, 0))i∈I , Y, (θ′i)i∈I´.
In this case, defining for every G ∈ RK+ ,
c(G) = min{−p · y : (y,G) ∈ Y } = −max{p · y : (y,G) ∈ Y }
and for every i ∈ I, gi : RK+ → R by
gi(G) = (p
g
i − θ′ipg) ·G+ θ′ic(G)
then
`
(xi, G)i∈I , (y,G), (gi(G))i∈I
´
is what is called in Mas-Colell–Silvestre [40] a linear cost share equilibrium
of the economy E ′.
Proof. The first part of the corollary is actually a particular case of the previous one. Recall that, in view of
Assumption B.2, the maximum profit p · y + pg · G is nonnegative. If p · y + pg · G > 0, define for each i ∈ I,
θ′i =
p·(xi−ωi)+pgi ·G
p·y+pg·G . If p·y+pg ·G = 0, define for each i ∈ I, θ′i = 1|J| . In both cases,
`
(xi, G)i∈I , (y,G), (p, (p
g
i )i∈I)
´
is a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium of the economy E ′ = `(RL+ × RG+, Pi, (ωi, 0))i∈I , Y, (θ′i)i∈I´.
Let us now turn to the second part. The cost share system verifies
P
i∈I(p
g
i − θ′ipg) = 0 and
P
i∈I θ
′
i = 1. On
the other hand, in view of the profit maximization at (y,G), c(G) = −p·G and for each i ∈ I, gi(G) = pgi ·G−θ′i(p·
y+pgi ·G), which implies p·xi+gi(G) = p·ωi. Now, (xi, G) ∈ Pi(xi, G) implies p·xi+pgi ·G > p·ωi+θ′i(p·y+pg ·G)
≥ p · ωi + θ′i(p · y + pg ·G) for all y such that (y,G) ∈ Y , thus p · xi + gi(G) > p · ωi.
To sum up, starting from a (weakly) Pareto optimal Lindahl–Foley feasible allocation of the original economy
and keeping unchanged the initial endowments of consumers, it is not necessarily possible to redistribute the
profit shares so that the (weakly) Pareto optimal allocation is a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium allocation of the new
economy. In the next section, under additional assumptions, we will get for public goods economies the same
result as in economies with only private goods: (weakly) Pareto optimal Lindahl–Foley feasible allocations are
Lindahl–Foley equilibrium allocations of the economy obtained from the original one by redistributing initial
endowments and profit shares of consumers.
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6. Lindahl–Foley equilibrium and the core
Let us now set the following additional assumptions:
B.4: Each consumer i ∈ I has a complete and transitive preference ordering i on Xi weakly monotone in
public goods: eGi ≥ Gi implies (xi, eGi)  (xi, Gi) ∀xi ≥ 0 (no public bads),
B.5: For each producer j ∈ J , Yj ⊂ RL × RK+ (public goods are never production inputs).
The next proposition shows that, under B.4, Lindahl–Foley equilibrium consumption allocations belong to the
core.
Proposition 6.1. Assume B.4 on Economy E. If `(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , ygj )j∈J , (p, (pgi )i∈I)´ is a Lindahl–Foley equi-
librium, then for each i ∈ I, pgi ≥ 0 and the consumption allocation (xi, G)i∈I belongs to the core C(E).
Proof. We first claim that since (p, (pgi )i∈I) is a quasiequilibrium price, p
g
i ≥ 0 holds for each i ∈ I. Indeed, it
follows from transitivity and completeness of the preference preorders, monotony in public goods and local no
satiation in private goods at (xi, G) that Gi > G ⇒ pgi · G ≥ pgi · G. Thus the vector price pgi cannot have a
(strictly) negative component.
Then assume that the coalition S blocks (xi, G)i∈I via the S-feasible pair
`
(xi)i∈S , GS
´
. We have for some
(yj , y
g
j )j∈J ∈
Q
j∈J Yj :
(6.1) (
X
i∈S
xi, G
S) =
X
i∈S
(ωi, 0) +
X
i∈S
X
j∈J
θij(yj , y
g
j )
(6.2) (xi, G
S) i (xi, G) for each i ∈ S.
From (6.1) and the equilibrium definition, we deduce:
p ·
X
i∈S
xi + (
X
i∈S
pgi ) ·GS > p ·
X
i∈S
ωi +
X
i∈S
X
j∈J
θij(p, p
g) · (yj , ygj ) ≥ p ·
X
i∈S
ωi +
X
i∈S
X
j∈J
θij(p, p
g) · (yj , ygj ).
From (6.2) and our first claim, it follows:
p ·
X
i∈S
xi + (
X
i∈S
pgi ) ·GS ≤ p ·
X
i∈S
xi + p
g ·GS = p ·
X
i∈S
ωi +
X
i∈S
X
j∈J
θij(p, p
g) · (yj , ygj ).
We thus have a contradiction.
The last proposition shows, under the assumptions B.4 and B.5, the complete symmetry between concepts
and optimality properties of Lindahl–Foley equlibrium for a public goods economy and Walras equilibrium for a
private goods economy. However, it should be stressed that these assumptions (made by Foley in [20, 21]) are
necessary neither for the existence of Lindahl–Foley equilibrium nor for the decentralization of (weakly) Pareto
optimal Lindahl–Foley feasible allocations with personalized taxes and lump sum transfers.
Proposition 6.2. In addition to the assumptions of Proposition 5.2, assume B.4 and B.5 on the economy E. Let`
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J
´
be a Lindahl–Foley feasible allocation of E such that (xi, G)i∈I is (weakly) Pareto optimal
and let (p, (pgi )i∈I) the price system whose Proposition 5.2 establishes the existence. The allocation together with
the price system is a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium of the economy E ′ = `(RL+ ×RG+, Pi, (ω′i, 0))i∈I , (Yj)j∈J , (θ′ij) i∈I
j∈J
´
for
θ′ij =
8<:
p
g
i ·y
g
j
pg·ygj
if ygj 6= 0
1
|I| if y
g
j = 0
and ω′i = xi −
X
j∈J
θ′ijyj .
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Proof. Recall that, in view of NT and IR, p 6= 0 and (pgi )i∈I 6= 0. From B.4 and B.5 and the definition of the
new profit shares, it follows that θ′ij ≥ 0 for every i ∈ I and for every j ∈ J , with for every j ∈ J ,
P
i∈I θ
′
ij = 1.
Then, for every i ∈ I, p ·xi+pgi ·G = p ·ω′i+
P
j∈J θ
′
ijp ·yj+pgi ·
P
j∈J y
g
j = p ·ω′i+
P
j∈J θ
′
ijp ·yj+
P
j∈J θ
′
ijp
g ·ygj =
p · ω′i +
P
j∈J θ
′
ijpij(p, p
g) and the proof is complete.
7. Concluding remarks
As Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium is less an equilibrium concept than a characterization of
(weak) Pareto optimality, we are left at the end of this presentation with two equilibrium concepts.
The first one according to the analytical point of view adopted in this paper, the second one from an historical
point of view since its first elaborations dates back to 1985 [3, 6], is the public good private provision equilibrium.
As already noticed, private provision of public goods leads to sub-optimal equilibrium allocations of private and
public goods. This drawback, the same which was pointed out by Samuelson, is at the origin of a huge literature
on Pareto improving government interventions, beginning with [3, 57], that is at the very time of the definition
of public goods private provision equilibrium.
The second one, the Lindahl–Foley equilibrium, dating back to 1967–1970 [20, 21], is the translation of the
Lindahl solution refered to by Samuelson. However, most of economists, including Samuelson himself, deny
to this equilibrium the ability of being implemented by any market mechanism. Lindahl–Foley equilibrium
does not satisfy the incentive compatibiity constraint as defined by Hurwicz [32]: equilibrium does not requires
that revealing the information necessary for the price mechanism to function be the best strategy of individual
consumers. Here also, a huge literature on mechanism design begins in 1977–1980 with the tentative of resolution
of the free-rider problem by Groves and Ledyard [28, 29]. This literature will tend to substitute the equilibrium
of a suitably defined mechanism to the equilibrium of the original economy and to found on the government
enforcement of appropriate mechanisms the public economic policy of public goods market economies.
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